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AVOIDING AN ENVIRONMENTAL SURPRISE: STEPS WHICH
THE CONSUMER REAL ESTATE PURCHASER SHOULD TAKE
TO AVOID ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY
by Tyler D. Tennent*
Sean M. Higgins**
I. Introduction
Imagine that you have just pur-
chased a home. After you have
closed the deal, you learn that the
soil under your home is contami-
nated and the Environmental Pro-
tection Agency ("EPA") is holding
you responsible for the exorbitant
costs of cleaning up the contamina-
tion. You are liable despite the fact
that you did absolutely nothing to
contaminate the property and had
no idea about the contamination
when you purchased the property.
As disturbing as this scenario
may be, it is entirely plausible.
Under a major Federal environ-
mental statute, the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Com-
pensation, and Liability Act
("CERCLA")' and various state
laws, 2 landowners can be liable for
the cost of cleaning up environ-
mental contamination even where
they are not at fault for the contam-
ination. The possibility that a party
who did not contribute to environ-
mental contamination may be sub-
ject to extensive environmental
clean-up liability raises important
issues for consumer real estate pur-
chasers ("consumers"). Consum-
ers are less likely to possess the
financial resources necessary to
meet environmental liabilities and
are less likely to possess sophisti-
cated knowledge of environmental
laws and defenses than are com-
mercial real estate purchasers. At
the same time, consumers are less
likely to engage in activities that
cause or exacerbate environmental
contamination.
This Article will examine steps
which the consumer should take in
order to avoid environmental
clean-up liability under CERCLA.
The Article also touches upon the
issues which a consumer must con-
sider in avoiding liability under
various state environmental laws.
First, the Article begins by provid-
ing an overview of CERCLA's lia-
bility scheme and describing the
defenses available to landowners
against CERCLA liability and the
regulatory provisions which might
mitigate an owner's liability. Sec-
ond, the Article describes these
defenses in more detail along with
the steps which a consumer pur-
chaser should take to insure that
the defenses will be available.
Next, the possible contractual
steps which a consumer should
take to minimize potential envi-
ronmental liability are examined.
Finally, the Article concludes with
a discussion of the additional legal
remedies which the liable consum-
er might pursue.
II. BACKGROUND
A. CERCLA's Liability Scheme
Federal statutes and various
state laws create the possibility of
environmental liability for pur-
... any consumer who
purchases contaminated
property may be held liable
for the costs of cleaning up
the contamination that prior
owners created.
chasers of property, even where the
purchasers do nothing to contrib-
ute to environmental contamina-
tion. The major federal statute,
which will be the focus of this
Article, is CERCLA, the Compre-
hensive Environmental Response,
Compensation and Liability Act of
1980, as amended by the Super-
fund Amendments and Reauthori-
zation Act of 1986 ("SARA").
CERCLA provides that various
parties, known as Potentially Re-
sponsible Parties ("PRPs"), may
be held liable for the costs of
cleaning up environmental con-
tamination. PRPs include, most
importantly, landowners. Even
those owners who did not create or
contribute to the contamination
may be held liable for clean-up
costs. 3 Thus, any consumer who
purchases contaminated property
may be held liable for the costs of
cleaning up the contamination that
prior owners created.4
Also, owners are jointly and
severally liable for cleanup costs.5
As a result, a party who unknow-
ingly purchases contaminated
property, without exacerbating or
contributing to the contamination,
may be found liable for the full
amount of the clean-up costs. The
party might be able to recover part
of the full amount through contri-
bution if the other liable parties are
solvent and available.
B. Defenses To Liability Under
CERCLA
CERCLA, and its 1986 SARA
amendments, however, provide
various defenses to liability. Two
of the minor and basic defenses are
Act of God and Act of War.6 As
their titles indicate, these defenses
are out of the consumer's control
and insignificant for purposes of
this Article. There are two other
defenses of which the consumer
real estate purchaser should be
aware. The first of the defenses is
known as the third-party defense.
The second defense is the innocent
landowner defense.
1. Third Party Defense
Under the third-party defense, a
landowner is not liable for environ-
mental contamination that is sole-
ly caused by the act or omission of
* Partner, Clark, Klein & Beaumont, Detroit,
Michigan; J.D., Detroit College of Law,
1984.
- Associate, Clark, Klein & Beaumont,
Detroit, Michigan; JD., University of Wis-
consin-Madison, 1991.
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a third party who has no contractu-
al relationship with the landown-
er.7 CERCLA broadly defines the
term "contractual relationship" to
include any instrument transfer-
ring title.8 As a result of this expan-
sive definition, a landowner can-
not establish the third-party
defense if a prior owner of the
property caused the environmental
contamination. If the landowner
establishes that a third party
caused the contamination, the
owner must also prove, by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence, that
... a purchaser may
establish the innocent
landowner defense if the
purchaser undertakes what
is known as a Phase One
Environmental Assessment
before purchasing the
property.
due care was exercised in prevent-
ing the release of the hazardous
substance and that precautions
against the contamination by fore-
seeable acts of third parties were
taken. 9
Thus the third party defense is
aimed at the party who owns land
which is contaminated by a non-
owner without the owner's knowl-
edge. The third party defense is not
available where the property was
contaminated by an earlier owner.
The defense is unavailable even if
the current owner did not know
that the property was contaminat-
ed.
2. Innocent Landowner Defense
The 1986 SARA amendments to
CERCLA, however, provide a de-
fense to purchasers who acquire
land contaminated by a prior own-
er, who do not know, and have no
reason to know, about the contami-
nation. The SARA amendments
accomplish this by expanding the
third-party defense. SARA pro-
vides that a contractual relation-
ship does not exist where a party
acquires property after contamina-
tion and does not know and has no
reason to know about the contami-
nation.10 If an owner can establish
these elements, then the owner will
Volume 4 Number 3/Spring, 1992
not be liable for environmental
clean-up costs.
SARA makes it clear that the
purchaser must take certain steps
in order to fulfill the elements of
this defense. In order for the owner
to establish that he or she does not
know, and has no reason to know,
about the contamination, the own-
er must, before acquiring the prop-
erty, undertake "all appropriate
inquiry into the previous owner-
ship and uses of the property con-
sistent with good commercial or
customary practice."" To deter-
mine whether a purchaser has
made an appropriate inquiry,
SARA mandates that courts con-
sider whether the defendant pos-
sesses specialized knowledge or ex-
perience, the relationship between
the purchase price and the value of
the property if uncontaminated,
"commonly known or ascertain-
able information about the proper-
ty" and the obviousness and ease
of detecting the contamination.12
This defense, known as the inno-
cent landowner defense or inno-
cent purchaser defense, raises im-
portant questions for the consumer
because it focuses on the purchas-
er's knowledge. In determining the
availability of this defense, SARA
calls for the consideration of com-
mercial or customary practices and
the purchaser's knowledge. This
language opens the possibility that
the consumer, who is likely to be
less knowledgeable than the com-
mercial real estate purchaser, will
be held to a lower standard of
knowledge. ' 3
Notwithstanding the issue of the
purchaser's knowledge, it is now
widely accepted that a purchaser
may establish the innocent land-
owner defense if the purchaser
undertakes what is known as a
Phase One Environmental Assess-
ment before purchasing the prop-
erty. A Phase One Assessment en-
tails inquiry about the prior uses to
which the property was put, review
of government records regarding
use and ownership of the property
and environmental compliance on
the property, and physical review
of the property for signs of contam-
ination. The Phase One Assess-
ment does not include taking soil
samples on the property.' 4
While the Phase One Assess-
ment is currently the standard en-
vironmental inquiry, increasing
environmental knowledge may
eventually render it inadequate. 5
Courts have raised questions as to
whether it is necessary for consum-
ers to undertake a Phase One As-
sessment.'
6
The Phase One Assessment rais-
es an important issue: too much
knowledge. The goal of the Assess-
ment is to fulfill SARA's reason-
able inquiry requirement. Unless
the Phase One Assessment is itself
suggestive, the purchaser should
not go beyond it to gather addition-
al data which suggests that contam-
inants might be present. For exam-
ple, a purchaser should not
conduct soil tests unless the Phase
One Assessment indicates that
contamination is present. Unnec-
essary soil tests may indicate a
minimal presence of a possible
... a consumer, who is
unlikely to buy and sell
property regularly, might be
subject to a lower
knowledge and inquiry
standard than a commercial
purchaser.
contaminant. The presence of the
contaminant may be natural. How-
ever, if environmental contamina-
tion is later found, the tests may
lead the EPA or a court to conclude
that the purchaser should have
known about the contamination
and should have undertaken a
more extensive inquiry. As a result,
the owner may lose the benefit of
the innocent purchaser defense.
C. Statutory & Regulatory
Provisions To Mitigate
Liability
CERCLA also provides for set-
tlement, for a nominal amount, of
claims against parties who are po-
tentially liable because of property
ownership but who are not respon-
sible for the contamination. In
order to take advantage of this
provision, the owner must not
have caused, exacerbated or con-
tributed to the contamination. 7
This provision seeks to protect the
(continued on page 78)
77
Loyola Consumer Law Reporter
Environmental Surprise
(continued from page 77)
landowner who has not caused or
contributed to environmental con-
tamination but who has not met
the reasonable inquiry require-
ments of the innocent purchaser
defense.1 8
Finally, a recent EPA policy
statement provides that residential
The consumer real estate
purchaser may need to
refrain from conducting a
Phase One Assessment in
order to preserve the
innocent landowner
defense.
real estate purchasers will not be
held liable under CERCLA.19 The
statement provides that the EPA
will not require residential proper-
ty owners to pay environmental
remediation costs so long as their
activities have not caused or exac-
erbated environmental contamina-
tion and the owners have cooper-
ated with the EPA's remediation
efforts.20 The policy statement de-
fines a residential property owner
as a person who owns residential
property and uses the property in a
manner consistent only with resi-
dential purposes. 2
The EPA's policy statement
does not entirely relieve the con-
sumer of concerns about environ-
mental liability. First, the EPA
states that the policy statement
serves only as administrative guid-
ance and does not create a right in
residential property owners.22 The
policy is therefore subject to
change. The consumer who buys
land relying on this pronounce-
ment and accordingly does not
take the steps required to establish
the innocent purchaser defense,
may later find that the EPA has
changed its policy and the owner is
therefore subject to environmental
liability.
Second, the policy applies only
to purchasers who use their proper-
ty in a manner consistent with
residential purposes. The consum-
ers who transform their property
into a non-residential facility may
subject themselves to environmen-
tal liability. Therefore, a consumer
should take further steps to guard
against environmental liability.
Ill. Considerations For The
Consumer Real Estate Purchaser
A. The Consumer Real Estate Pur-
chaser And The Innocent Land
Owner Defense
The SARA amendments, which
establish the innocent landowner
defense, provide that the determi-
nation of whether a purchaser
knew or should have known about
environmental contamination de-
pends on the purchaser's knowl-
edge and experience.
SARA'S text thus suggests that a
consumer, who is unlikely to buy
and sell property regularly, might
be subject to a lower knowledge
and inquiry standard than a com-
mercial purchaser. This issue is
important because a lower stan-
dard may spare the consumer from
While the purchaser, after
learning about
contamination, may
attempt to adjust the
purchase price or simply
decide not to purchase the
property, a devisee does
not have this option. The
devisee or gift recipient,
therefore, is not as capable
of avoiding or defraying
environmental liability...
undertaking a Phase One Assess-
ment. A Phase One Assessment
can be costly. As a result, the
consumer may wish to avoid or
minimize the expense of a Phase
One Assessment.
One court has explicitly suggest-
ed that the knowledge and inquiry
standards required to establish the
innocent purchaser defense vary
according to the type of purchaser
involved. In United States v. Pacif-
ic Hide & Fur Depot, Inc.,23 the
United States District Court for
the District of Idaho concluded
that SARA's text and legislative
history indicate that courts should
apply a three-tier standard in de-
termining availability of the inno-
cent purchaser defense. Commer-
cial purchasers are subject to the
highest standard, purchasers in pri-
vate transactions, or consumers,
are subject to a mid-level standard,
and parties who acquire property
through inheritance, bequest, or
gift, are subject to the lowest stan-
dard.2 4
In Pacific Hide & Fur, the court
considered the liability of three
groups of owners. The owners had
each acquired through devise or
gift, stock in a corporation which
owned land contaminated by PCB
laden capacitors. 25 The record in-
dicated that none of the parties
actually knew that PCB's were pre-
sent on the land or that capacitors
containing PCB's had been dis-
posed of on the property.26
While the court considered the
parties more akin to recipients of a
bequest than purchasers in a pri-
vate transaction, and thus subject
to the lowest knowledge and inqui-
ry standard, the court's discussion
might give some guidance about
the knowledge and inquiry stan-
dard which a consumer must meet
in order to establish the innocent
purchaser defense. First, the court
held that SARA's legislative histo-
ry indicates that the distinction
between commercial and private
transactions is, in itself, signifi-
cant. Private purchasers and devi-
sees are subject to a lower standard
than commercial purchasers. 27
Second, the court held that a
party who conducts no environ-
mental inquiry whatsoever may, in
some cases, successfully claim the
innocent purchaser defense.2 8 Spe-
cifically, the court held that the
defendants' failure to undertake an
environmental inquiry did not bar
them from establishing the inno-
cent purchaser defense. The court
based this determination on the
defendants' lack of experience,
lack of involvement in operations
on the site, and the fact that the
defendants involuntarily obtained
ownership of the property. 29
The court based its conclusion
that these circumstances excused
the defendants from conducting an
environmental inquiry because of
SARA's use of the terms "appro-
priate" and "reasonable." ' 30 Ac-
cording to the court, these terms
indicated that Congress "was not
laying down [a] bright line rule"
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and that "each case... must be
analyzed on its facts." 3' The court
determined that if Congress in-
tended to prevent an owner who
does not undertake an environ-
mental inquiry from establishing
the innocent purchaser defense,
SARA would explicitly require
purchasers to make an inquiry in
every case.32
Then the court went beyond this
pronouncement. The parties' fail-
ure to conduct an environmental
inquiry did not bar them from
establishing the innocent purchas-
er defense even though they had
reason to know that some contami-
nants were present. The defen-
dants, while present on the proper-
ty, found holes eaten in their
clothing by battery acid. 33 The
court held this knowledge irrele-
vant because the contaminants at
issue were PCB's, not battery ac-
id. 34
Pacific Hide & Fur raises several
significant points. First, it strongly
suggests that a land owner who is
sufficiently lacking in knowledge,
... the Serafinicourt
appears to clarify that a
land owner's ability to
interpose the innocent
purchaser defense
depends on the practice of
similar purchasers.
experience and involvement need
not conduct any inquiry in order to
establish the innocent purchaser
defense. Obviously, this point
must be tempered by the fact that
the defendants in Pacific Hide &
Fur did not voluntarily acquire the
property. However, the multiple
standards adopted by the court
indicate that the consumer may
not need to conduct a Phase One
Assessment to establish the inno-
cent purchaser defense.
This absence of clarity in the
courts raises a further and possibly
disturbing point. The consumer
real estate purchaser may need to
refrain from conducting a Phase
One Assessment in order to pre-
serve the innocent landowner de-
fense. A Phase One Assessment
might yield unnecessary informa-
tion that could later prevent the
consumer from establishing the in-
nocent purchaser defense. This
seemingly bizarre result could arise
in much the same way that com-
mercial purchasers, who go beyond
a Phase One Assessment to con-
duct unnecessary soil tests, might
forfeit the innocent purchaser de-
fense.
The second significant aspect of
Pacific Hide & Fur is that the court
allowed the defendants to assert
the innocent purchaser defense de-
spite the fact that they were aware
The consumer might seek
further protection from
liability by including an
indemnity clause in the
purchase agreement.
that contamination, albeit contam-
ination different from that at issue,
was present on the property. The
decision thus suggests that only
actual knowledge of the specific
contamination at issue will prevent
a party who purchased property in
a private transaction from estab-
lishing the innocent purchaser de-
fense.
This conclusion, however,
should be tempered by the fact that
the defendants in Pacific Hide &
Fur had involuntarily obtained
ownership. A distinction between a
purchaser who is aware of some
type of contamination and a devi-
see or gift recipient who is aware of
some type of contamination seems
appropriate. While the purchaser,
after learning about contamina-
tion, may attempt to adjust the
purchase price or simply decide
not to purchase the property, a
devisee does not have this option.
The devisee or gift recipient, there-
fore, is not as capable of avoiding
or defraying environmental liabili-
ty after learning of potential con-
tamination.
The Pacific Hide & Fur court is
not alone in permitting an owner
who has not made an environmen-
tal inquiry to establish the inno-
cent purchaser defense. In United
States v. Serafini35, the United
States District Court for the Mid-
dle District of Pennsylvania
reached a similar conclusion. In
Serafini, unlike Pacific Hide & Fur,
the court resolved a dispute be-
tween sophisticated investors. In
Serafini, the defendants' partner-
ship purchased a former landfill
site which had once been owned by
a municipality. 36 The government
argued that the defendants were
liable because, at the time of pur-
chase, the site was littered with
contaminated drums. As a result, a
visit to the site would have re-
vealed an environmental prob-
lem.37 The government also argued
that the defendants possessed spe-
cialized knowledge because the de-
fendant, Serafini, had been a secre-
tary of the corporation which
originally purchased the site from
the municipality. 38 Thus the gov-
ernment argued that the defen-
dants' failure to conduct an envi-
ronmental investigation barred
them from establishing the inno-
The purchaser should avoid
restricting indemnification
to government mandated
clean-ups.
cent purchaser defense.39
The court rejected the govern-
ment's argument and denied its
motion for summary judgment be-
cause the government submitted
no evidence supporting a conclu-
sion that "failure to inspect or
inquire was inconsistent with good
commercial or customary practic-
es."40 The court indicated that the
government should have submit-
ted affidavits from commercial re-
al estate developers stating that
good commercial practice entailed
an environmental inquiry before
purchasing a "225 acre tract of
land to be developed at a later
date." 4'
The significance of the court's
decision in Serafini is two-fold.
First, the Serafini court appears to
clarify that a land owner's ability to
interpose the innocent purchaser
defense depends on the practice of
similar purchasers. Under this ap-
proach, a consumer's liability is
determined by whether the con-
sumer undertook a similar inquiry
to that undertaken by other con-
sumers.
Second, the Serafini court indi-
cated that the inquiry which a
purchaser must undertake is deter-
mined by the practice of buyers
(continued on page 80)
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purchasing a similar tract of land.
This aspect of the court's decision
in Serafini is potentially significant
for the consumer. Under this ap-
proach, it appears that some con-
sumers would not need to under-
take any inquiry. For example, the
consumer who buys a one acre lot
in a historically residential subdi-
vision might be able to establish
that purchasers of similar parcels
do not conduct an environmental
inquiry. On the other hand, the
consumer who purchases a large
parcel of farm land might face a
more stringent inquiry require-
ment in light of the practices fol-
lowed by purchasers of large land
parcels.
Serafini thus suggests an addi-
tional factor which consumers
should consider. Consumers
should ascertain the type of envi-
ronmental inquiry which purchas-
ers of similar types of real estate
generally undertake. If purchasers
of similar parcels do not undertake
a Phase One Assessment, the pur-
chaser may wish to refrain from
such an inquiry.
B. Contractual Protections Against
Environmental Liability
1. Indemnity clauses
There is, of course, the risk that
a consumer will be unable to estab-
lish the innocent purchaser de-
fense. The consumer might, there-
fore, seek further protection from
liability by including an indemnity
clause in the purchase agreement.
Such a clause would require the
seller to indemnify the purchaser
for any environmental liabilities
that the purchaser will incur.
There are issues that the pur-
chaser should consider before in-
serting an indemnity clause into a
real estate agreement. First, the
purchaser should consider whether
the seller is financially capable of
providing indemnification for en-
vironmental liability. This concern
seems especially relevant to con-
sumers. Consumer real estate
transactions are likely to involve
smaller and less expensive parcels
of land than in commercial real
estate transactions. As a result, the
seller might not possess the finan-
cial resources necessary to indem-
nify the purchaser for environmen-
tal liabilities.
One commentator suggests an
alternative which might be useful
to the consumer who is concerned
that the seller will not be able to
provide indemnification. The par-
ties might then enter into a long-
term lease of improvements on the
property. 42 Such an approach
would convey, for example, only
the house that a consumer is inter-
ested in acquiring. Depending on
the type of subdivision and proper-
ty, such an approach might prove
desirable where the seller is not
capable of indemnifying the pur-
chaser.
... the consumer will
probably find that a general
warranty which guarantees
that the land complies with
environmental laws and
regulations is sufficiently
protective.
A second issue that the purchas-
er should consider is the question
of who will conduct any necessary
environmental clean-up. The sell-
er, who must finance the clean-up,
is likely to seek control over the
remediation process. 43 The pur-
chaser, likely to lack specialized
knowledge, will probably find this
arrangement desirable.
The consumer should also con-
sider what costs are covered by the
indemnification agreement. Clean-
up costs do not constitute the
entire range of expenses. The in-
demnification agreement, to ade-
quately protect the consumer,
should also provide that the seller
will cover investigation costs, at-
torney's fees, governmental fees,
and the costs of third-party claims
arising from the contamination.44
The final issue that the consum-
er should consider is the question
of what event will trigger indemni-
fication. The purchaser should
avoid restricting indemnification
to government mandated clean-
ups. The purchase agreement
should require the seller to indem-
nify the buyer for cleanup costs
incurred because of the require-
ments of lenders and subsequent
purchasers as well as those of the
state and federal governments. 45
2. Express Environmental
Warranties
A purchaser might also seek pro-
tection from environmental liabili-
ty by securing an express warranty
that the property is free from po-
tential environmental liabilities.
One commentator has suggested
the provisions that such a warranty
should include. Among the sug-
gested provisions are guarantees
that there are no potential or pend-
ing litigation or administrative
proceedings; no environmental law
violations; that prior owners' ac-
tivities complied with environ-
mental laws and regulations; that
hazardous wastes were not "gener-
ated," "treated," or disposed of on
the property; and that the property
is not contaminated by hazardous
materials. 46
The Tenth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals enforced an express environ-
mental warranty in Nunn v Chemi-
cal Waste Management, Inc.47 The
transaction in Nunn, unlike a typi-
cal consumer transaction, involved
two sophisticated corporate parties
of approximately equal bargaining
power.48 The seller in Nunn gave
warranties which reflected those
suggested by the commentators de-
scribed above. 49 The defendant
purchasers had stopped payment
on a land contract after the state
discovered leakage of environmen-
tal contaminants. The defendants
interposed the warranties as a de-
fense to the plaintiffs' lawsuit for
the amount due under the con-
tract.5 0 The trial court found for
the defendants and the plaintiffs
appealed."
The Tenth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals partially affirmed the trial
court. The court found the warran-
ties sufficient although they did
not specifically mention leakage of
hazardous waste. The court held
that a warranty providing that the
land contained no violations of
state laws and regulations was suf-
ficiently specific to warrant against
leakage. Leakage of contaminants
was proscribed by state environ-
mental laws. The warranty, there-
fore, applied to the leakage.52
The court also made important
points about warranty construc-
tion and remedies. Although the
purchaser had drafted the warran-
ties, the court refused to construe
80 Volume 4 Number 3/Spring, 1992
ambiguous provisions against the
purchaser because both of the par-
ties were sophisticated and pos-
sessed equal bargaining power.53
The court also held that the pur-
chaser was entitled only to remedi-
ation costs. Releasing the purchas-
er from the land contract was
inappropriate because traditional
warranty principles limit recovery
to the difference between the war-
ranted value of the property and
the true value of the property. The
court concluded that the amount of
the remediation costs reflected this
difference.5 4
Nunn illustrates warranty prin-
ciples that are important to con-
sumers. First, the consumer will
probably find that a general war-
ranty which guarantees that the
land complies with environmental
laws and regulations is sufficiently
protective. At best, the consumer
purchaser will possess, as did the
parties in Nunn, the same amount
of knowledge and sophistication as
the seller. The consumer, there-
fore, is unlikely to find that a court
will unfavorably construe ambigu-
ous warranty provisions.
Also, another important factor
is the measure of damages. The
consumer will not be able to recov-
er the full purchase price or be
... caveat emptorshould
not deter the consumer
faced with liability under
CERCLA from suing for
contribution.
released from its obligations under
a real estate contract. However, the
consumer should be able to recover
remediation costs. An express en-
vironmental warranty is thus an
alternative method of ensuring
that the consumer will not be ulti-
mately liable for clean-up costs.
C. Lawsuits for Indemnity or
Contribution
1. Indemnity
The consumer should be aware
that indemnity is best handled
contractually rather than through
litigation. Without a contractual
provision, a party cannot secure
indemnity against a party who is
not primarily liable. As a result, a
Loyola Consumer Law Reporter
purchaser will not be able to recov-
er any amount of liability from a
seller who is not responsible for the
environmental contamination. For
example, in Philadelphia Electric
Co. v. Hercules, Inc.,55 the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals stated
that indemnity is actionable only
against a party who is primarily
liable. In Philadelphia Electric, nei-
ther party was primarily liable.
Both parties incurred environmen-
tal liability by being successors in
interest to the party who caused the
contamination.5 6 Therefore, a con-
sumer will not be adequately pro-
tected by a common law indemnity
action. In many cases, the seller
will not be primarily liable and
thus the purchaser will be unable to
seek recovery through a common
law action that is based on an
indemnity theory.
2. Contribution
CERCLA, however, permits a
real estate purchaser to seek contri-
bution from a seller regardless of
whether the seller is primarily lia-
ble. CERCLA provides that "any
person may seek contribution from
any other person who is liable or
potentially liable"5 7 CERCLA fur-
ther states that, in deciding contri-
bution claims, courts should "allo-
cate response costs... using such
equitable factors as the court deter-
mines are appropriate. '58
The consumer who is liable un-
der CERCLA may therefore be
able to recover remediation costs
from a seller. For example, in
Smith Land and Import Corp. v.
Celotex Corp.59, the Third Circuit
Court of Appeals interpreted this
language to liberally allow purchas-
ers to seek contribution from sell-
ers.
However, courts have treated
contribution suits brought by an
owner to recover environmental
liabilities imposed under state en-
vironmental laws less favorably.
Specifically, the Third Circuit
Court of Appeals, while interpret-
ing Pennsylvania law, in Philadel-
phia Electric Co. v. Hercules, Inc.,60
held that the doctrine of caveat
emptor, or buyer beware, bars a
land owner from recovering from a
seller, pursuant to liability in-
curred under the state environ-
mental statute.6' The court noted
that the doctrine of caveat emptor
still governs land sales. 62 The court
characterized the vendor and
vendee in the sale of land as posses-
sing equal knowledge. As a result, a
buyer is limited to express contrac-
tual protections.63 The court thus
concluded that the doctrine of ca-
veat emptor prohibits an owner
from securing contribution from a
prior owner.
The court's decision in Hercules
illustrates to a consumer real estate
purchaser the importance of secur-
ing contractual guarantees, either
in the form of an indemnification
The consumer who is liable
under CERCLA may be
able to recover remediation
costs from a seller.
clause or of an environmental war-
ranty, from a seller. The Hercules
court, however, appeared to leave
open the possibility that caveat
emptor might be applied less strin-
gently to a consumer real estate
purchaser. The court noted a wide-
ly accepted exception to caveat
emptor which permits implied war-
ranties to arise where new homes
are sold by a builder. The court
noted that this exception is rooted
in the fact that, in such transac-
tions, the seller is in a better posi-
tion to know of defects. 64
The Hercules court, however,
interpreted this exception very
narrowly. According to the court,
the exception arose from the differ-
ence between structures and land.
A builder is in a better position to
know of defects in a building, while
both parties are equally likely to
know of defects in unimproved
land. 65 The Hercules court applied
the doctrine of caveat emptor in a
contribution suit under state envi-
ronmental laws. Hercules does not
provide much support for soften-
ing the caveat emptor doctrine in a
real estate transaction involving a
consumer under state law.
However, caveat emptor should
not deter the consumer faced with
liability under CERCLA from su-
ing for contribution. In Smith
Land, the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals held that caveat emptor is
(continued on page 82)
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a factor which courts should con-
sider in allocating liability under
CERCLA rather than a bar to
contribution. 66 The Smith Land
court concluded that applying ca-
veat emptor to completely bar re-
covery based on contribution
would be inconsistent with con-
gressional intent.61 Such an ap-
proach would discourage owners
from undertaking remedial actions
and would cause ill will between
the government and the liable par-
ty. The court, however, noted that
caveat emptor type considerations
may be a factor in determining the
availability of contribution for lia-
bility incurred under CERCLA.
The court indicated that this con-
sideration would take the form of
inquiring into whether the pur-
chase price was reduced by the
amount of potential clean-up costs.
In such a case, permitting the seller
to recover under a contribution
theory would result in double com-
pensation of the seller. 68
Contribution suits are thus
available to the consumer who is
held liable under CERCLA. More-
over, it is not likely that a court will
apply caveat emptor to mitigate a
seller's liability for contribution to
a consumer. A consumer does not
appear likely to possess the experi-
ence and leverage to negotiate a
sale price that reflects potential
clean-up costs.
IV.Conclusion
The consumer who purchases
real estate and surprisingly discov-
ers that the land is contaminated
may be liable for the cost of an
environmental clean-up. This con-
sumer, by taking the right steps,
may escape or mitigate environ-
mental liability. The purchaser
should act only as a consumer and
limit the use of the property to
residential purposes. This step will
allow a consumer to benefit from
the EPA's policy toward residen-
tial property owners. However,
this policy is not an absolute shield
against CERCLA liability. More-
over, the consumer remains poten-
tially liable under state environ-
mental laws.
Therefore, the consumer must
take additional steps to seek pro-
tection from possible environmen-
tal liability. First, the consumer
must, prior to purchasing property,
undertake an environmental inqui-
ry sufficient to establish the inno-
cent purchaser defense. Under cur-
rent law, it is unclear what
constitutes a sufficient inquiry for
the consumer. A Phase One Envi-
ronmental Assessment clearly
meets the inquiry requirement.
However, it appears that the re-
quired inquiry depends also on the
practice of similar purchasers of
similar tracts of land. As a result,
consumers might not be required
to undertake a Phase One Assess-
ment in order to establish the
innocent purchaser defense.
The consumer should also go
beyond the steps needed to estab-
lish the innocent purchaser de-
fense. The consumer can include
an indemnification clause in the
purchase agreement. Alternatively,
the consumer can secure environ-
mental warranties from the seller.
Either approach permits the con-
sumer to recover environmental
clean-up costs.
Finally, the consumer can pur-
sue legal remedies such as contri-
bution and indemnity actions
against the seller. Common law
indemnity will be effective only if
the seller is primarily liable. Con-
tribution may or may not be per-
mitted under state law due to the
caveat emptor doctrine. However,
an owner may freely sue a seller for
contribution under CERCLA.
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